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THE EVOLUTION OF A PRINCIPLE
The entrance to law is like the penetration of a thicket-hard,
thorny, devious and distressing. Each traveler must find the way for
himself, and none can show another. Law is in fact a growth of
experience rather than a creation of art. Useful principles spring up
but are smothered by the rank growths of tradition or the wilder sug-
gestions of cunning and cupidity. Nothing excellent can show all its
fair proportions, and the fine discoveries of great jurists are hid away
beneath the entangling encroachments of preposterous technicalities.
Depending upon men's minds as well as their experience, upon their
intelligence as well as their knowledge, law partakes of the infirmities
of those who think it, and can never arrive nearer to perfection than
ihe faculty which conceives and shapes it. For this reason it is a
distressing science, now baffling by the obscurities of its doctrines,
now offending by the boldness of its iniquities. A word misspelled,
a letter omitted, stands between an atrocious crime and its merited
punishment. A word too much in a testament may defeat the benevo-
lence of a father. Equity halts and hesitates; it will reform and also
enforce a contract, but it will not at the same time reform and en-
force. The old maxim, "Ubi jus ibi remedium," is a delusion and a
snare, for remedies are sometimes withheld from obvious rights and
where justice is evident it is often denied because precedent is lacking.
Judges pretend to do what has been done, Jus dicere non jus dare, but
they make a wrong use of a right judgment. Declaring that hard cases
make ba4 law, they force bad law to make hard cases. The trouble
lies not in the law, since that may be anything men will have it, but
in those who aim at justice and cannot perceive it. Students are slow
to understand. Not all are of equal capacity. Some lack diligence.
Human experience cannot be mastered easily. We have not yet
learned how to select the best men for office, and where judges are
elected some bad lawyers must sit in judgment. In view of these
obvious influences, it is remarkable not that law is as bad but that it
is as good as we find it. It is on the whole an excellent science-the
very best achievement of man's wit and experience-but its excellences
are as hard to perceive as its deficiencies are to pardon. A good rule
is good because its consequences are good, but we must know those
consequences in order to appreciate either the meaning or the value
'f the rule.
Washington University Open Scholarship
THE EVOLUTION OF A PRINCIPLE.
I propose to discuss a case, which has perhaps been as influential
in the development of American constitutional law as any contained
in the books, in the hope that I may thereby show the origin of law,
its necessity, its constant mutation, its flexibility and adaptability, its
high purpose, its occasional futility and its abiding usefulness.
The Dartmouth College case came on for hearing before the
United States Supreme Court nearly a century ago. It was argued
by Webster and a greater lawyer than Webster, one Mason, on be-
half of the college. The judgment was written by Mr. Justice Story,
Chief Justice Marshall concurring in a separate opinion. It decided
that the charter of a private educational corporation conferred by
law was a contract within the meaning of the federal constitution
which could not be impaired by a subsequent law. The facts pre-
smted to the court need not be discussed. They were such as to
provoke the moral resentment of an honest man. As the decision
corrected what was deemed a wrong, it was approved by everybody
at that time. It declared, however, a principle, and from that prin-
ciple, sound as it seemed, unnumbered troubles have proceeded. If a
court says a particular act is wrong, and it is wrong, the court has
done no harm; but if it says that this act and all similar acts are
wrong, it has declared a principle which may do more or less harm
as the authority of the court is more or less extended. The Supreme
Court of the United States has jurisdiction over all the states of the
Union. The principle therefore declared by it in the Dartmouth Col-
lege case controlled these states.
Another case arose which involved the principle, and the court
was suddenly confronted by its consequences. A corporation was
chartered to build a bridge across the Charles river, and did so. After-
wards another company was chartered with power to build a bridge
across the same stream, and the effect of its construction was to
impair the value of the first company's charter. The first company
contended that its charter rights were inviolable, but the court held
otherwise upon the ground that the immunity claimed was not ex-
pressly conferred. It will be observed that the injustice complained
of seems to have been identical in both cases. In the one, property
conveyed to certain trustees was put under the management of others
selected by the state; in the other, property appropriated to public use
was destroyed by a subsequent act of the legislature. The court modi-
fied its principle, but not expressly. They declardd that charters were
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still to be regarded as contracts, but as contracts, should be strictly
construed, and no right should be implied which was not expressly
conferred. Later, acting upon the suggestion of Mr. Justice Story,
the states of the Union began to avoid the principle altogether by
enacting general or special laws which provided that all charters
should be subject to alteration, amendment or repeal by the legisla-
ture; and thereupon the principle so elaborately established, so excel-
lently fortified, so evidently just, seemed in danger of extinction. It
was saved from this fate by the prudence of business men. They
would not embark their resources in an enterprise which depended
upon the caprice of the legislature, and to avoid this risk demanded
and received charters which expressly provided that they should not
be subject to alteration, amendment or repeal notwithstanding the gen-
eral law. The Dartmouth College case again became the keystone of
all public enterprises. Mischief followed. Rights became vested
which were found injurious to the general welfare, and to remedy this
evil the people of various states put in their constitutions a prohibi-
tion against special unalterable charters and required all corporations
to be created by general laws. Again the principle of the Dartmouth
College case became ineffectual with respect to all charters conferred
by the state. Later, however, a new use was found for it.
A state is an unwieldy body, incompetent to perform all the re-
sponsibilities of government. To assist it, counties, cities, towns and
villages were created, each having local authority with respect to local
matters. These municipalities were endowed with powers requisite
for their usefulness and among others with power to control the use
of highways and contract for water, light and public work. In the
course of time they conferred franchises or local privileges deemed
sufficient to induce private enterprise to undertake a general service.
Water and gas companies created under general laws in this manner
derived local franchises of great value, which were unguarded by
the repeal and alteration provision.
Again the principle of the Dartmouth College case became of
importance and the courts of the land were crowded with suits which
invoked its application. The principle on the whole was a sound one
and the courts enforced it wherever a manifest wrong was attempted.
It seemed unjust that today men should be offered an inducement to
public service and tomorrow deprived of all fruits of their invest-
ment. The principle was therefore reasserted in all its original vigor
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and for years men and lawyers again regarded it with a sort of
religious veneration.
Then began a train of evils which aroused a general indignation.
Not all men are honest. Corrupt men sought and obtained office, and
other corrupt men inaugurated schemes which involved a private bene-
fit at the general expense. Franchises of great value were purchased
and courts were confronted by the inviolability of legislative contracts
upon the one hand and the public welfare upon the other. When such
cases came before the Supreme Court of the United States, it in-
clined instinctively to afford relief and having such a propensity
availed itself of the doctrine of the Charles River Bridge case to refine
away the obnoxious parts of such grants or so modify them as to
deprive them of their injurious consequences. Franchises were so
strictly construed as to leave nothing in them. A right to charge
not more than five cents was held to mean a right to charge so much
less than five cents as the legislature required. Considerations were
inquired into as well as the terms used, and where it did not appear
that the grant made was offered for a consideration reserved, the
franchise was held not to be contractual in character. Other refine-
ments were invented, and in the course of time hardly a remnant of
the principle of the Dartmouth College case could be discovered in
the opinions of the judges. Lawyers cited it with diffidence and none
ventured to rely upon it. All charters became alterable, if not in
terms yet in effect.
Now followed a succession of wrongs which none could contem-
plate without shame. Availing themselves of the new doctrine with
respect to legislative contracts, local bodies began to confiscate prop-
erty appropriated to the public service. Rates were imposed which
left no profit to the owners and private management was interfered
with. The public service became hateful to investors. Alterable
grants were so changed as to leave nothing of value. The taxing
power was employed where the reserved power of alteration was in-
effectual. The Dartmouth College case after a century had become a
historical incident, interesting as showing the development of law but
influential no longer. Today the doctrine of the United Railways case
is paramount and men have ceased to rely upon a principle which time
had made venerable. Our ancestors thought it a very Rock of Gibral-
tar, but it has crumbled before modern artillery and the itinerant stu-
dent of law will gaze upon its ruins with that melancholy interest
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which is apt to be inspired by some remnant of antiquity, obsolete
now but once useful and admired.
The sequel is interesting. Dimly perceiving that injustice cannot
long result in good, public service commissions have been set up to
correct local wrongs, and now we are trying out a new experiment.
The courts, repenting perhaps the consequences of their judgments,
have invented a new doctrine which is still in the making. Having
disposed of the Dartmouth College case, they have availed themselves
of another provision of the federal constitution to afford relief in
all desperate cases. The reserved power to alter, amend or repeal
now universal has been hemmed in by the limitation that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. A grant
in terms alterable may not be so altered as to deprive the grantee
of all substantial benefit intended to be conferred.
And so the principle has swung to and fro like an unwieldy
pendulum, now inclining this way, now that, now fruitless, now effica-
cious, always, however, vacillating toward some righteous purpose and
never departing far from justice. I append for the use of those who
1A valid charter granted to the trustees of Dartmouth College is a con-
tract within the meaning of that clause of the constitution of the United States
which declares that no state shall make any law impairing the obligation of
contracts.
Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.
2 Public grants must be strictly construed. The grant of power to erect a
bridge and exact tolls does not prevent a subsequent grant of power to another
corporation to erect a bridge over the same stream where the effect of the con-
struction of the latter bridge is to impair the revenues of the first grantee.
Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.
3 The rule for the construction of charters is that they shall be most
strongly construed against the corporation. Every reasonable doubt is to be
resolved adversely. Nothing is to be taken as conceded but what is given in
unmistakable terms or by implication equally clear. The affirmative must be
shown. Silence is negation and doubt is fatal to a claim. This doctrine is
vital to the public welfare. It is axiomatic in the jurisprudence of this court.
Northern Co. vs. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.
Newton vs. County Commrs., 100 U. S. 548.
Pearsall vs. R. R. Co., 161 U. S. 664.
Freeport Water Co. vs. Freeport, 180 U. S. 587.
Stanislau Co. vs. S. I. Co., 192 U. S. 201.
4Where a charter confers a right, privilege or immunity but no considera-
tion is provided to be given to the state or the company is required to do noth-
ing in return for such right, privilege or immunity, the grant is a nude pact
and may be revoked.
Christ Church vs. Philadelphia, 65 U. S. 300.
Salt Co. vs. E. Saginaw, 80 U. S. 373.
Tucker vs. Ferguson, 89 U. S. 527.
R. R. Co. vs. Miller, 132 U. S. 75.
Grand Lodge vs. N. 0., 166 U. S. 143.
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wish to trace the course of those events which I have currently de-
scribed, a table which contains the significant cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court upon the subject. The table is neces-
sarily incomplete. Other cases will have to be decided. There has
arisen in the City of St. Louis a difficulty which will tax the ingenuity
of the lawyers and the flexibility and usefulness of law. The McKin-
ley System is engaged in interstate commerce. It sought and received
from the City of St. Louis a franchise to operate over certain streets
upon condition that it should not charge more than five cents for
carrying a passenger from St. Louis to East St. Louis. Its franchise
is alterable, amendable and repealable, since it so provides. After a
time it was discovered that five cents was not a remunerative rate for
the service rendered, and thereupon the corporation applied to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to charge ten cents.
Its prayer was granted. St. Louis, however, insisted upon the obser-
vance of the condition of its grant, and now threatens to revoke the
franchise. The question presented is: Has the city such power?
It is perhaps proper to add that no contract may be made even by a
s An alterable, amendable or repealable charter cannot be regarded as a
cotract within the meaning of that clause of the federal constitution which
pw hibits a state to pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract.
Piqua Bank vs. Knoop, 57 U. S. 369.
Sherman vs. Smith, 67 U. S. 587.
Hamilton Gas Co. vs. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258.
Bienville Water Co. vs. Mobile, 186 U. S. 219.
a. Where by such a charter the stock and real estate of a corporation
are exempt from taxation, a subsequent law imposing a tax on such prop-
erty is valid.
Tomlinson vs. Jessup, 82 U. S. 454.
Water Co. vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 1.
Stearns vs. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 240.
b. Where by such a charter no special provision is made for the pay-
ment of a debt, a subsequent law may require a sinking fund to be estab-
lished and maintained.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700.
c. Where by such a charter it is provided that a state may eledt
four directors of a corporation, a subsequent law giving the city the right
to elect seven is valid.
Miller vs. New York, 82 U. S. 478.
Spring Valley Water Co. vs. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347.
d. Where by such a charter conferred upon a railroad nothing is
said with respect to telegraph lines, a subsequent law requiring the com-
pany to maintain and operate such lines is valid.
U. S. vs. R. R. Co., 160 U. S. 1.
e. Where such a charter provides that a corporation shall pave part
of a street between its rails, a subsequent law requiring it to pave outside
its rails is valid.
Sioux City Ry. Co. vs. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98.
Worcester vs. Ry. Co., 196 U. S. 539.
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municipality which will impair the authority of Congress with re-
spect to interstate commerce, and that that authority has been con-
ferred by a valid law upon the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The question is an interesting one. He will be a wise man who can
predict the judgment of the court. Upon the one hand stands a
repealable charter granted upon a condition which has been violated;
upon the other stands the paramount power of Congress with respect
to interstate commerce. How can the two be reconciled? It is not
incredible that a federal court will decide that a local franchise in-
volving interstate commerce was intended to be exercised in sub-
ordination to the authority of Congress, and that a corporation shall
not be punished for complying with such authority or doing what
such authority requires it to do. There is another clause in the con-
stitution to which I have already referred-that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. To grant a fran-
chise today which involves the investment of large sums of money
f. Where by such a charter an exclusive right to sell gas within a
city is granted, a subsequent law authorizing another company to sell gas
within the city is valid.
Hamilton Gas. Co. vs. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258.
g. Where under such a charter a railroad has been constructed, the
legislature may require the corporation to abandon its established route and
extend its tracks in a different direction into a union station.
Worcester vs. Ry. Co., 109 Mass. 103.
Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319.
h. Where such a law exempts shareholders from personal liability, a
subsequent law imposing such liability with respect to future debts is valid,
Sherman vs. Smith, 67 U. S. 587.
Looker vs. Maynard, 179 U. S. 51.
i. However harshly a subsequent law may operate, it cannot be held
to impair the obligation of a contract if the charter be alterable, amend-
able or repealable in terms. The corporation by accepting the grant sub.ject to the legislative power must be held to have assented to such reserva-
tion.
Hamilton Gas Co. vs. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 256.
Erie R. R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U. S. 685.
j. Where such a charter is repealed, every right, privilege and fran-
chise conferred by the charter is revoked.
Piqua vs. Knoop, 57 U. S. 369.
Pa. College Cases, 80 U. S. 190.
Tomlinson vs. Jessup, 82 U. S. 454.
Maine Central R. R. Co. vs. Maine, 96 U. S. 499.
Greenwood vs. Union Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13.6 That the reserve power has a limit, no one can doubt. All agree that
it cannot be used to take away property already acquired under a charter or
deprive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession or con-
tracts lawfully made.
Miller vs. N. Y., 82 U. S. 478.
R. R. Co. vs. Paul, 173 U S. 404.
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and to revoke it tomorrow without just cause is to confiscate the in-
vestment, and it is altogether probable that this clause will afford
protection against the injury proposed. If the court shall so decide,
this extraordinary result will follow. After a century of experiment,
long after the principle of the Dartmouth College case has become in
fact obsolete, charters which that case cannot be invoked to protect
because in terms they are alterable, amendable and repealable, will be
protected under the due process of law clause of the constitution.
The old principle under a new guise will be as influential in the
development of law as, notwithstanding its constant neglect and pres-
ent discredit, the old principle used to be. It was designed to prevent
injustice. It was roughly used perhaps, but it is essentially sound.
I. H. LIONBZRGXR.
Where under a repealable charter a corporation is required to pay a
SecIal tax or render a special service as a consideration for an exemption
from a general tax, a subsequent law cannot impose a property tax and also
insist upon the special tax or service.
Water Co. vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 1.
Stearns vs. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 240.
SThe power of alteration, amendment or repeal is not without limit. The
alterations must be reasonable; they must be made in good faith and be con-
sistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation. Sheer oppres-
sin and wrong cannot be inflicted under the guise of alteration and amend-
ment. Beyond the sphere of the reserve power, the vested rights of property
of the corporation are surrounded by the same sanctions and are as inviolable
as in other cases.
Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700.
R. R. Co. vs. Smith, 173 U. S. 684.
' The United Railways Co. case is entitled "St. Louis vs. United Railways
Co.." and may be found in 263 Mo., p. 387, and 210 U. S. 266.
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